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Robert Leckey and Eric Ward* Taking Stock: Securities Markets
and the Division of Powers
Recent developments in Canada's securities markets highlight their national
character and call for a fresh consideration of the question of federal securities
regulation. Developments in the constitutional case law have changed the legal
context, such that the trade and commerce and the peace, order and good
government powers under the Constitution Act, 1867 would likely support federal
securities legislation. The securities question, important in its own right, also
serves as a case study for how the Supreme Court of Canada conducts division
of powers analysis for matters that have undergone substantive change. The
authors contend that competence over a provincial matter should be reassigned
to Parliament only when that matter has changed so substantially that untenable
legal fictions are required to keep it 'Within the province," no benefits associated
with the values of federalism arise from continuing provincial jurisdiction, and
uniform interprovincial cooperation is required for effective regulation. The
existing level of interprovincial cooperation regarding securities shows the need
for national regulation and raises concerns about influence based on market and
not democratic power: by virtue of its market dominance, Ontario exerts a
significant extra-territorial influence over other provinces' securities regulators.
While a reorganization of Canada's securities regulation would clearly require
negotiation between the two levels of government, the increasing strength of the
legal case for federal regulation, in terms of changes in the securities markets and
in the constitutional case law, would influence such negotiations.
Des developpements recents dans les marches financiers canadiens indiquent
le caractere national de ceux-ci et soulevent donc le besoin d'une nouvelle
analyse de la question de la reglementation fed6rale des valeurs mobilibres. Des
d6veloppements dans la jurisprudence constitutionnelle en ont aussi modifie le
cadre legal: une loi f6d6rale reglementant les valeurs mobilieres serait
probablement valide en vertu de la competence g6nerale en matiere d'6changes
et de commerce, ainsi qu'en vertu de la comp6tence en matiere de paix, d'ordre
et de bon gouvernement. La question des valeurs mobilieres, aussi importante
soit-elle, sert egalement d'exemple de la maniere dont la Cour supreme du
Canada fait I'analyse du partage des competences quand une matiere s'est
profond6ment modifiee. Les auteurs pr6tendent que la competence d'une
matiere provinciale ne puisse btre accordee au Parlementparla Courque lorsque
cette matiere s'est modifi6e dans une mesure o& elle ne serait plus "dans la
province" que grece j une fiction juridique insoutenable, lorsqu'aucun benefice
associe aux principes du f6deralisme ne decoulerait de la continuation de la
comp6tence provinciale, et lorsque la reglementation efficace exigerait une
coordination inter-provinciale uniforme. Quant aux valeurs mobilibres, le niveau
de coordination inter-provinciale faitpreuve de la n6cessit6 d'une reglementation
nationale. Or cette coordination soulbve une influence qui se fonde sur une
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puissance dans les march6s et non pas sur un pouvoir d~mocratique: la
puissance de ses march~s permet a I'Ontario d'exercer un pouvoir extra-
territorial, pour ainsi dire, sur la reglementation des valeurs mobili~res dans les
autres provinces canadiennes. Tandis que la r6alit6 politique ne permettrait pas
l'instauration d'un r6gime f6d6ral dans le champ des valeurs mobilieres sans des
pourparlers entre les deux paliers de gouvernement, la puissance croissante de
I'argumentjuridiquepourla r6glementation f6d~rale, soit i cause des changements
dans les march~s, soit a cause des changements dans le cadre jurisprudentiel,
influencerait sans doute de telles n~gociations.
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March 15, 1999, witnessed yet one more indication of the changing
character of Canada's financial markets. On that day, Canada's four stock
exchanges entered into a Memorandum of Agreement "intended to
enhance the efficiency of the trading facilities."' This agreement is
explicitly not a corporate merger between them. Yet by the terms of this
cooperative venture, the Stock Exchanges agreed to specialize, each of
them becoming the exclusive provider of trading facilities and services in
a single market sector.2 What is significant is that the Stock Exchanges
divided the Canadian market by product or market sector, not by geog-
raphy. This development among the major self-regulatory organizations
for the securities markets in Canada3 suggests that unifying forces are
predominating over regional differences, and that Canada needed a single
coordinated system. The Stock Exchanges cannot be viewed in isolation
from the other components of Canada's markets. The March 1999
Agreement shows a need to view not only market administration, but also
regulation on a national level.
1. Memorandum of Agreement by The Alberta Stock Exchange, The Montreal Exchange,
The Toronto Stock Exchange and Vancouver Stock Exchange [hereinafter collectively the
"Stock Exchanges"] (15 March 1999) [hereinafter the "March 1999 Agreement"].
2. Ibid. The Montreal Exchange will provide exclusively for all exchange-traded derivative
products, including any type of option and futures contracts; the Toronto Stock Exchange will
provide for all senior securities; and the Alberta Stock Exchange and Vancouver Stock
Exchange will provide for all junior securities. Subsequent amendments desired by Quebec do
not detract from the overall impact of the March 1999 Agreement.
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Serious discussion about a national securities regime in Canada began
with the Porter Report (1964)4 and the Kimber Report (1965). 5 In 1979,
the federal government published Proposals for a Securities Market Law
for Canada.6 Most recently, the current federal government has pursued
the issue, releasing in 1994 a draft Memorandum of Understanding
Regarding the Regulation of Securities in Canada.7 This document
proposed that an autonomous new Canadian Securities Commission be
established by the federal government, to which both the federal and the
provincial governments would delegate regulatory power. This proposal
for delegation obviated the question of who properly had legislative
competence over regulation of securities. The initiative became mired in
funding and other squabbles, however, and it seems for the moment as
though the federal government lacks the political will to proceed towards
national securities regulation in the face of provincial resistance.8
In recent years, it is not only the securities markets, but also the law
itself that has changed. The Supreme Court of Canada (the "Supreme
Court" or the "Court") has given greater substance to some of the federal
heads of power. The constitutional analysis of securities regulation is
different in 2000 than it was before cases such as General Motors of
Canada v. City National Leasing,9 R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada,0
Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board),"l RJR-MacDonald
Inc. v. Canada (A. G.), 12 R. v. Hydro-Qugbec13 and even the Reference Re
3. M.R. Gillen, Securities Regulation in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1998) at 89.
4. Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Banking and Finance (Ottawa: Queen's
Printer, 1964).
5. Ontario, Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Securities Legislation in Ontario
(Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1965). See D. Tse, "Establishing a Federal Securities Commission"
(1994) 58 Sask. L. Rev. 427 at 427.
6. Proposals for a Securities Market Law for Canada (Consumer and Corporate Affairs
Canada, 1979), 3 vols. [vol. 3 is hereinafter Proposals].
7. Printed in (1994), 17 O.S.C.B. 4401.
8. See, for example, "National Unity of National Securities" The Globe and Mail (25 June
1996) A14; A. Willis, "Uncertain Future Hobbles OSC" The Globe and Mail (26 June 1996)
B15. The stubbornness of the premier of British Columbia and Ontario's demand for $200
million in compensation obviated a head-on conflict between the federal government and the
Parti Qurbrcois government in Quebec.
9. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641, 58 D.L.R. (4th) 255 [hereinafter City National Leasing cited to
S.C.R.].
10. [ 198811 S.C.R. 401,49 D.L.R. (4th) 161 [hereinafter Crown Zellerbach cited to S.C.R.].
11. [1993] 3 S.C.R. 327, 107 D.L.R. (4th) 457 [hereinafter Ontario Hydro cited to S.C.R.].
12. [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, 127 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [hereinafterRJR cited to S.C.R.].
13. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213, 151 D.L.R. (4th) 32 [hereinafter Hydro-Quibec cited to S.C.R.].
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Secession ofQuebec.14 Moreover, the recurring discussion of the place of
securities regulation in the federation suggests that the subject lies along
a fault-line in constitutional argument and so serves as a focus for analysis
of broader issues in constitutional law. Through the timely example of
securities regulation, we shall explore the issue of the division of powers
in the face of substantive change in a provincial matter.
This analysis is more than academic. Jeremy Webber has written that
it is important to know the constitutional legal status in advance of key
political events;' 5 this reasoning applies to securities regulation in
Canada. Given the dynamics of current Canadian federalism, any change
would require federal-provincial dialogue and cooperation; indeed, any
future initiative might only proceed with delegated authority along the
lines of the 1994 draft memorandum. Moreover, there are numerous
political concerns with the issue that lie beyond the scope of this paper.
Nevertheless, a conviction that Parliament had the strong constitutional
authority to legislate unilaterally respecting securities, without even
obtaining the provinces' agreement to delegate provincial authority,
would alter the dynamics of any future negotiation. We hope that this
study will, to some degree, advance the public policy discussion about
regulation of securities and enrich the understanding of how the Supreme
Court approaches the division of powers.
I. Description and characterization of securities markets
and regulation
The securities markets are said to perform two basic functions. First, they
bring together persons seeking funds and persons who have surplus funds
to invest. The markets perform this function through underwriting and
distributing new issues of securities in a process referred to as "primary
market" trading. Second, the system provides a liquid market for the
trading of outstanding securities. In this "secondary market" trading, an
investor exchanges securities for payment from another investor, gener-
ally without involving the issuer. The securities market actors who
perform these functions are underwriters, brokers and dealers, and
advisors. 16
14. [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 161 D.L.R. (4th) 385 [hereinafter Secession Reference cited to
S.C.R.l.
15. J. Webber, "The Legality of a Unilateral Declaration of Independence under Canadian
Law" (1997) 42 McGill L.J. 281 at 284-85.
16. Gillen, supra note 3 at 24-25 and 423-26.
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We will not attempt to explore deeply the definition of "security."
Provincial securities acts typically define "security" to include "any
bond, debenture, note or other evidence of indebtedness, share, stock,
unit, unit certificate, participation certificate, certificate of share or
interest, preorganization certificate or subscription."' 7 Frank Iacobucci
(as he then was) contributed a substantial background paper to Proposals
for a Securities Market for Canada, and there is little need to retread the
same ground.'8 In any case, the proliferation of securities and quasi-
securities products in the last twenty years further complicates that
question beyond the scope of this paper.
Securities are distinguishable from consumer products. For example,
sale of securities gives rise to a fiduciary duty. Securities are also subject
to elaborate regulation requiring, among other things, registration of
persons involved in the securities business, registration of securities
themselves, and substantial disclosure.' 9 The costs associated with
compliance with these regulatory requirements are considerable.
Currently, the Canadian securities markets are regulated primarily by
provincial legislation supported by the provinces' power over "property
and civil rights within the province."2 There are ten provincial and three
territorial securities regulatory authorities.2 ' Provincial regulators have
recognized to some extent the challenges that the existing structure
creates for the markets. The provincial and territorial securities regula-
tory authorities together comprise the Canadian Securities Administra-
17. Ibid. at 107 [footnotes omitted].
18. F. lacobucci, "The Definition of Security for Purposes of a Securities Act" in Proposals,
supra note 6 at 221.
19. D. Johnston & K.D. Rockwell, Canadian Securities Regulation, 2d ed. (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1998) at 6-7.
20. Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 92(13), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985,
App. II, No. 5 [hereinafter the "Constitution"]. The main sources of law with respect to
securities legislation include provincial securities acts, the regulations passed pursuant to those
acts, policy statements, blanket orders, notices and decisions of securities administrators and
the by-laws, rules and policies of stock exchanges and other self-regulatory organizations. See
Gillen, supra note 3 at 87-99.
21. The securities acts of the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, Newfound-
land, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Quebec and Saskatchewan create securities commissions. The
securities acts of New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, the Northwest Territories, the Yukon
Territory and Nunavut do not create separate commissions, but instead assign administrative
responsibilities to government officials. Gillen, supra note 3 at 88-89.
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tors ("CSA"). Through this loose association, they have instituted certain
measures to coordinate their activities and regulatory standards across the
country.
22
In Ontario, securities legislation is intended "to provide protection to
investors from unfair, improper or fraudulent practices" and "to foster
fair and efficient capital markets and confidence in capital markets."23 It
is significant that fostering confidence in the markets is one of the chief
goals of securities regulation. It means that the public perception of
securities markets must be a substantive concern of the level of govern-
ment dealing with them; there cannot be effective regulation without
confidence in the markets.
24
Provincial power to regulate is limited by the inapplicability of
provincial laws to the essential corporate attributes of federal corpora-
tions.2 1 So while provincial regulators cannot make discretionary deci-
sions concerning federal corporations' issuing of securities, provincial
rules concerning the use of licensed brokers 26 and with respect to insider
trading apply to all corporations. 27 Parliament has enacted valid legisla-
tion regulating certain aspects of the securities markets under its power
over criminal law.28
Parliament has never enacted a general securities law, 29 and the
absence of comprehensive federal securities legislation has led courts to
stretch the provincial power to regulate securities beyond what might
appear to be the normal bounds of subsection 92(13).3o Yet Lamer C.J.
has written: "There is no doctrine of laches in constitutional division of
powers doctrine; one level of government's failure to exercise its juris-
22. For an optimistic account of CSA initiatives, see D.A. Brown, "After MacKay: Re-
aligning Financial Services Regulation: A Framework for Market Regulation in Canada"
(Securities Superconference, Hotel Intercontinental, Toronto, 24 February 1999), online:
Ontario Securities Commission <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca> (date accessed: 1 March 1999).
23. Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S-5, s. 1.1 [hereinafter the "Ontario Act"]. See also Gillen,
supra note 3 at 79-87.
24. Johnston & Rockwell, supra note 19 at 4-5.
25. Manitoba (A.G.) v. Canada (A.G.), [1929] A.C. 260, [1929] 1 D.L.R. 369 [hereinafter
Manitoba Securities].
26. Lymburn v. Mayland, [1932] A.C. 318, [1932] 2 D.L.R. 6 (P.C.).
27. For example, a remedy for insider trading established by a province was upheld
notwithstanding a comparable federal remedy. See Multiple Access v. McCutcheon, [ 1982] 2
S.C.R. 161, 138 D.L.R. (3d) 1 [hereinafter Multiple Access cited to S.C.R.].
28. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 380(2), 382, 383, 384 & 400.
29. In contrast, the United States has federally enacted securities legislation in addition to
state regulation. See Gillen, supra note 3 at 73-74.
30. See, for example, Dupont v. Taronga Holdings, [1987] R.J.Q. 124, 49 D.L.R. (4th) 335
(Sup. Ct.); R. v. W. McKenzie Securities, [1966] 4 C.C.C. 29, 56 D.L.R. (2d) 56 (Man. C.A.).
See also Tse, supra note 5 at 438.
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diction, or failure to intervene when another level of government exer-
cises that jurisdiction, cannot be determinative of the constitutional
analysis."'" That provincial securities legislation has been found to be
intra vires the provincial legislatures should not be taken to mean, then,
that federal jurisdiction has been thereby displaced. In the absence of a
federal securities regime, courts have allowed provinces wide regulatory
powers. These powers may operate in tandem with federal rules so long
as the rules do not directly conflict. Where equally valid federal and
provincial rules could not both be satisfied, the federal paramountcy rule
would render the provincial rule inoperative.
3 2
Since the existing regulatory regime in Canada is complex,3 3 discus-
sion of the regulation of securities in isolation from the rest of the
Canadian financial services landscape is somewhat artificial. Securities
firms (dealers and portfolio managers) have traditionally been viewed as
constituting one of the "four pillars," alongside the banks, trust compa-
nies, and insurance companies. In addition, there are today a number of
other participants, including finance companies, mortgage brokers and
financial planners. Mutual funds and other collective investment arrange-
ments are increasingly important providers of financial services to
Canadians and do not fit easily into the architecture of the four pillars.
Separate provincial or federal legislation governed each of the four
pillars, granting, at least in theory, the exclusive right to provide a core
financial service. Banks provided commercial and consumer loans,
accepted deposits and offered chequing accounts. Insurance companies
underwrote and sold insurance. Trust companies provided estate and trust
administration and mortgage loans. Securities firms underwrote new
issues of securities, and sold and advised with respect to securities in the
primary and secondary markets. There was little overlap between the
products and services offered by each pillar, and cross ownership be-
tween the pillars was limited or prohibited. The extensive reform to the
BankAct34 in the late 1980s changed this situation dramatically with the
31. Ontario Hydro, supra note 11 at 357. See also Reed J. on the non-existence of
"constitutional squatters' rights," Alberta Government Telephones v. C.R.T.C., [1985] 2 F.C.
472 at 488, 15 D.L.R. (4th) 515 (T.D.), rev'd [1986] 2 F.C. 179, 24 D.L.R. (4th) 608 (C.A.),
aff'd [1989] 2 S.C.R. 225, 61 D.L.R. (4th) 193.
32. R. v. Smith, [1960] S.C.R. 776, 25 D.L.R. (2d) 225 [hereinafter Smith]; Royal Bank of
Canada v. LaRue, [1928] A.C. 187 (P.C.).
33. Brown, supra note 22: Brown observed that a federally chartered financial institution,
operating in every province and territory with both a securities subsidiary and an insurance
subsidiary, may have to deal with over 30 regulatory authorities, many of them with different
rules and offering varying protections for consumers. Johnston and Rockwell have written that
"the existence of 12 varying jurisdictions does diminish the efficient market goal" (supra note
19 at 252).
34. S.C. 1991,c. 46.
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virtual elimination of the rules separating the four pillars." One of the
most significant changes was the elimination of the prohibition against
banks owning securities dealers. Now that the big banks own the major
securities dealers, the banks are subject to federal legislation in respect of
their "banking" activities and provincial legislation in respect of their
securities dealings.36 The general trend is toward almost total integration
in the provision of financial services.
This trend is driven by much the same forces that are changing the
financial services industry rapidly and extensively world-wide. Techno-
logical advances have changed the way that securities markets operate.
Automation and Internet trading have made geographical barriers much
less important.37 A securities purchase transacted over the Internet is less
rooted in a determinable location than one conducted in a bank branch or
broker's office. These changes are significant for securities more than for
other products sold over the Internet, such as books, because securities are
subject to heavy, expensive regulation that applies on the basis of
geography.38 An interprovincial Internet sale of a book does not trigger
the same degree of regulatory compliance as does a securities trade.
Globalization, too, has changed markets. As Gillen has noted, North
American companies have sought increasing amounts of capital over-
seas, and there have been substantial increases in trading beyond national
borders.3 9
35. Brown, supra note 22.
36. Some market participants see a need to move towards functional regulation instead of
institutional regulation, the idea being that the provinces would retain control of the functions
that they regulated when the lines between institutions were clearer. See A Framework for
Market Regulation in Canada: A Concept Paper Prepared for the Canadian Securities
Administrators (February 1999), online: Ontario Securities Commission <http://
www.osc.gov.on.ca> (date accessed: 3 March 1999).
37. McKinsey & Company, The Changing Landscapefor Canadian Financial Services: New
Forces, New Competitors, New Choices (Research Paper prepared for the Task Force on the
Future of the Canadian Financial Services Sector) (September 1998), online: The Task Force
on the Future of the Canadian Financial Services Sector <http://finservtaskforce.fin.gc.ca>
(date accessed: 4 March 1999).
38. For example, see the Ontario Act, supra note 23, Part XI.
39. Gillen, supra note 3 at 43-44.
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For the purposes of this discussion, we assume that the basis of a
national regime of securities regulation would be the structure currently
in place in Ontario and that a federal act would be based on the Ontario
Act.
40
II. Division of powers: judicial reasoning
A brief review of the division of powers case law places this discussion
of securities in context. Behind the tests and interpretations that the courts
apply to the provisions of sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution lies a
constant concern: how can the distribution of powers in the Canadian
federation be balanced and re-balanced in changing circumstances? The
division of powers gives the appearance of fixity. This stability of form,
however, belies the chimerical nature of the substantive division of
powers between Parliament and the provincial legislatures. Technologi-
cal, social, and political forces continually subject the initial distribution
of powers to stress. In particular, problems may arise when a matter
initially recognized as within the legislative competence of the provinces
grows in complexity and inter-connectedness so as to make unilateral
regulation by a province impracticable. In such cases, arguments based
on efficiency might collide with concerns for the balance of powers
between the levels of government.
Where a matter not expressly assigned in sections 91 or 92 has grown
beyond its initial local nature, we suggest that courts generally have three
options. First, the courts might rely on a narrow assumption that the
provinces can only be responsible for discrete local matters that can be
dealt with by each province individually. In many cases this solution
might be efficient. It also respects the theory that provinces operate
independently as coordinate sovereign entities. It would result, however,
in an inexorable siphoning off of provincial powers to Parliament. The
drive for theoretical neatness would thus undo the balance of the federa-
tion and would present provinces with a disincentive to inter-relate since
so doing would signal that a matter was no longer provincial. Perhaps for
these reasons, courts have generally avoided this course.
40. Such assumptions are reasonable given the degree of market concentration in Toronto.
We will not discuss here the integration of federal securities legislation with existing federal
legislation such as the Bank Act. Compare Tse, supra note 5 at 441: "[The suggestion is] that
the federal government establish a securities commission with authority over all interprovin-
cial and international securities activity. This federal commission would also be responsible
for the investigation and prosecution of securities-related criminal activity. The existing
provincial securities commissions should be maintained to regulate intra-provincial securities
activity and promote regional economic concerns."
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Second, courts could choose always to leave matters to the level of
government where their exercise was first recognized as intra vires. Thus
even provincial matters that outgrow their local natures would remain
within provincial competence. Legal fictions could be employed to
designate a matter "within the province" though it might not really be so.
Moreover, provinces could be allowed latitude to cooperate in the
regulation of inter-connected matters. Such legal fictions, however,
might cost the law credibility. If they are unbelievable to the point of
absurdity, they might threaten the relevance of and respect for the
Constitution.
Given the current nature of securities markets, we will argue that the
existing constitutional distribution of power over securities is sustained
only by legal fictions that not only are costly to market participants and
to consumers, but, more importantly, are increasingly implausible. We
recognize that constitutional law will always rely to some degree on legal
fictions, but we suggest that if terms such as "within the province,"
"interprovincial" and "intraprovincial" are to retain meaning, the securi-
ties question should be reconsidered. Moreover, as we shall discuss, the
division of powers in the Constitution is not meant to allow a council of
provinces to impose a unified law upon all Canadians. Such a result would
attack the principles of diversity and local control that underlie the
federation.4
We suggest that a third option is most appropriate: normally, the
provinces should retain jurisdiction over matters previously within their
domain-even where the matter is increasingly inter-connected and only
fictionally "within the province." Provinces should be allowed room to
work cooperatively to further their own efforts at regulation. We recog-
nize that efficiency is clearly not the primary objective of Canada's
construction as a federation in the first place, but argue that, when judicial
latitude and legal fiction are used to keep within provincial jurisdiction
a matter that has changed substantially, some benefit associated with the
values of federalism should be attained, such as the possibility of respect
for diversity, of opportunities for local democratic solutions, or of
41. See, for example, Secession Reference, supra note 14 at 244-45 and 251. For the opinion
that interstate cooperation is consistent with the values of federalism in the United States, see
"To Form a More Perfect Union?: Federalism and Informal Interstate Cooperation" (1989) 102
Harv. L. Rev. 842.
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innovative and productive competition between governments.4 2 It would
be senseless to sacrifice efficiency and consistency in securities regula-
tion if there were no hope of gain in any of the values of federalism. Thus
where a provincial matter is highly inter-connected such that it cannot be
regulated unilaterally by a province, where it requires uniform treatment,
and where it is thereby not subject to local democracy or problem-
solving, there is a strong case that legislative treatment of it should be
upheld as intra vires Parliament.
We submit that when a provincial matter has substantively changed, as
securities has, it is not an adequate response to say that "the balance of
powers" in the federation precludes recognizing federal competence
respecting it. It is hard to see that the constitutional status quo is an
untouchable equilibrium. It is clear that the "balance of powers" is always
changing to some degree. For example, the provinces' powers over
hospitals4 3 has obviously increased in importance since 1867. It is
unclear, then, why greater jurisdiction in the economic field for Parlia-
ment is precluded. Indeed, we argue that keeping such a matter "within
the province" only by virtue of untenable legal fictions and by interpro-
vincial cooperation is at least as "unbalancing" as recognizing Parliament's
competence over it.
The regulation of securities is one such subject. While British Colum-
bia and Alberta may use securities regulation to help preserve theirjunior
and venture capital markets, 44 even proponents of continuing provincial
control admit that, in general, the matter requires a substantial degree of
uniform national regulation. 45 We submit that it is, for the most part, not
a matter that is susceptible to grass-roots local control, and that no
sufficient opportunity for diverse local responses compensates for the
42. On competition between governments in a federation, see A. Breton, "The Theory of
Competitive Federalism" in G. Stevenson, ed., Federalism in Canada: Selected Readings
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1989) 457; D.V. Smiley, The Federal Condition in Canada
(Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987) at 94-98. On the benefits of such competition in terms
of better legislation or regulation, see, for example, R.J. Daniels, "Should Provinces Compete?
The Case for a Competitive Corporate Law Market" (1991) 36 McGill L.J. 130; N. Guthrie,
"A Good Place to Shop: Choice of Forum and the Conflict of Laws" (1995) 27 Ottawa L. Rev.
201. See, contra, with a pessimistic view of such competition, S. Rose-Ackerman, "Risk
Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?" (1980) 9 J. Legal Stud. 593.
43. The Constitution, supra note 20 at s. 92(7).
44. Johnston & Rockwell, supra note 19 at 253.
45. Brown, supra note 22.
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losses in efficiency currently posed by provincial regulation. 46 Given the
requirement in Canada that a dealer register in every province where it
distributes securities, any benefit from the choice of forum competition
between jurisdictions would likely be offset by the expense of compli-
ance with different regimes in every province. Securities regulation is
distinguishable from corporate law, where a company may choose to
incorporate in the jurisdiction with the laws most favourable to it. The
choice of forum theorists do not contemplate concurrent compliance
47
with all the competing regimes in a federation but, obviously, a choice
between them.48 In Canada, in the absence of federal regulation of
securities, instead of having a competitive market of different, innovative
regimes, one province, Ontario, dominates and sets standards for the
others. Given that companies wishing to distribute their securities in other
provinces must still comply with the requirements of those provinces,
Ontario does not operate as a Delaware for securities regulation. We
argue, then, that securities regulation should fall to Parliament.
While Canadian courts have not explicitly adopted this approach, we
argue that it is consistent with the leading cases for the interpretation of
the general "trade and commerce power"49 and the "national concern"
branch of the power with respect to peace, order and good government.5 0
Both the City National Leasing and Crown Zellerbach cases apply
complex tests that can best be explained as attempts simultaneously to
allow, but also to restrict, federal jurisdiction over matters that have
become too general or too inter-connected to admit of independent
provincial regulation. The tests of "provincial incapability" and "provin-
cial inability" elaborated in these cases are phrased to permit some co-
operation between provinces without inviting provinces to introduce
national standards by regulating in lock step.
46. As Johnston and Rockwell have noted, current provincial differences in the provincial
regulatory systems include the closed system; levels of regulation; prospectus filing; hold
periods; insider trading reports; material change reports; registration of persons; limitation
periods; and sanctions (supra note 19 at 252). For a defence of provincial differences in
securities regulation, see Tse, supra note 5; F. Normand, "Nouvelle prrsidente de la Commis-
sion des valeurs mobiliires du Quebec: Carmen Crrpin est contra la creation d'une commission
pancanadienne" Le Devoir (3 September 1999) A6.
47. Even the selection of a principlejurisdiction for multi-provincial offerings underNational
Policy 1 has not eliminated duplication. See Johnston & Rockwell, supra note 19 at 254.
48See, for example, W.L. Cary, "Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware"
(1974) 83 Yale L.J. 663; R. Romano, "The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law" (1987)
8 Cardozo L. Rev. 709; Daniels, supra note 42; Guthrie, supra note 42.
49. The Constitution, supra note 20 at s. 91(2).
50. Supra note 20 at s. 91 [hereinafter the "p.o.g.g. power"].
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Admittedly, the Supreme Court would need convincing legal argu-
ments to justify a modification to the balance of powers concerning
securities. We suggest that using the trade and commerce power to
support a federal regime of securities regulation is the most desirable and
least radical course. Alternatively, if the trade and commerce power
proved insufficient to save federal securities regulations, the next most
preferable route is using the national concern branch of the p.o.g.g.
power. As a last resort, we would consider the power over banking,5 the
criminal law power,52 and the declaratory power over works for the
general advantage of Canada.53
In this matter, the onus falls on the party advocating recognition of
federal competence. The weight of resjudicata, stare decisis andjudicial
inertia falls on the side of ongoing provincial competence. A court could
reject our recharacterization of the securities markets as more general
than a particular industry. Moreover, while the legal tests applied are not
always strictly logical, the courts can still apply them; the trade and
commerce and p.o.g.g. tests could be interpreted to reject a federal
securities act.
Even had the Privy Council or the Supreme Court found securities to
be exclusively a provincial field, it is possible that the Court would one
day rule differently given changes in the matter. There is a suggestion that
the Court should be more willing to overrule constitutional cases than
others because there is no easy legislative recourse.54 Moreover, as
Professors Anisman and Hogg have noted in a discussion of the general
trade and commerce power, "the Supreme Court has indicated its willing-
ness, where necessary, to overrule decisions of the Privy Council as well
as its own earlier decisions."55 Furthermore, Professor Hogg has ob-
served that in the field of securities regulation, some laws already have
a double aspect.56 It is possible, then, that a federal securities act might
be found intra vires under one of the section 91 heads of power.
51. The Constitution, supra note 20 at s. 91(15).
52. Supra note 20 at s. 91(27).
53. Supra note 20 at s. 92(10).
54. P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) under
heading 8.7 [hereinafter Constitutional Law].
55. P. Anisman and P.W. Hogg, "Constitutional Aspects of Federal Securities Legislation"
in Proposals, supra note 6, 135 at 165 [footnotes omitted] [hereinafter "Constitutional
Aspects"].
56. Constitutional Law, supra note 54 under heading 15.5(c), discussing Smith, supra note
32; Multiple Access, supra note 27.
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Faced with a federal securities act, the courts would first need to
characterize the impugned legislation in its "pith and substance" and then
attempt to characterize it as within section 91 or section 92. A number of
approaches might inform the Supreme Court's consideration of the
securities question.
One approach to constitutional interpretation is originalism.5 7
Originalism generally carries little weight in the Supreme Court of
Canada. 8 Yet it has a certain amount of support in the academic
literature. Professor Abel has provided a reading of the framers' organi-
zational vision concerning the division of powers which amounts to a
modified originalism. Instead of wondering what the framers would have
said, he attempted to discern the organizational principles behind the
division of powers:
What clearly emerges is a bestowal on the Dominion of responsibilities
which have as their characterizing trait the management of the economy.
... What seems at first glance a mere congeries of specifics turns out to be
... really a roll call of... standard pressure points for effectuating financial
and market regulation-economic planning, if you will.59
Professor Abel's argument would suggest that securities, as more eco-
nomic than sociological, belong under federal jurisdiction.
In a discussion on competition, Professors Hogg and Grover wrote, "It
is surely obvious that major regulation of the Canadian economy has to
be national .... Indeed, a basic concept of the federation is that it must be
an economic union."' Surely they did not intend to espouse originalism,
but, at the same time, it is hard to see where their understanding of the
"basic concept" comes from if not from the framers. We accept the force
of this argument and submit that it is helpful in ensuring that the economic
heads of power, particularly trade and commerce, are given meaningful
interpretation.
57. For an American exposition of the position, see R. Berger, Government by Judiciary: The
Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1977).
58. See the Court's rejection of the special joint committee testimony and parliamentary
debates in interpreting s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11
[hereinafter Charter], in Reference Re B. C. Motor Vehicle Act, [ 1985] 2 S.C.R. 486,24 D.L.R.
(4th) 536.
59. A.S. Abel, "The Neglected Logic of 91 and 92" (1969) 19 U.T.L.J. 487 at 500-01; cited
in, for example, M. Patenaude, "L'interprdtation du partage des comp~tences a l'heure du libre-
6change" (1990), 21 R.D.U.S. 1, on the federal government's economic power in light of
Crown Zellerbach and City National Leasing.
60. P.W. Hogg & W. Grover, "The Constitutionality of the Competition Bill" (1976) 1 Can.
Bus. L.J. 197 at 199.
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A contrasting approach is the doctrine of progressive interpretation.
This doctrine stipulates that the general language used to describe the
heads of power is not to be frozen in the sense in which it was understood
in 1867.61 The doctrine traces its roots in Canadian constitutional inter-
pretation to Lord Sankey's dictum that the Constitution is like "a living
tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits. '6 Deter-
minations of the "natural limits," however, are likely to introduce some
reference to the intentions of the Constitution's framers.
It is not only section 91 but also section 92 that requires analysis. Much
depends on how narrowly a court chooses to read the last words of
subsection 92(13), "in the province," if it pays attention to them at all. As
Chelsea A. Sneed has noted, in Bennett v. British Columbia (Securities
Commission),6 3 the British Columbia Court of Appeal relied on the pith
and substance test; that is, the court upheld section 68 of the Securities
Act,64 even though the section might have extra-provincial effects,
because the pith and substance of the impugned section was local. The
extra-provincial effects were merely incidental. 65 In contrast, in Global
Securities, the same court struck down subsection 141(1)(b) of the B.C.
Act. Newbury J.A. wrote there that the subsection referred solely and
specifically to the laws of another jurisdiction, and that the extra-
provincial or cross-border aspect of the provision was its dominant
feature. The head of power under which the respondent Securities
Commission founded its authority in this matter was not property and
civil rights, but rather "the administration of justice in the province."66
Nevertheless, in this instance we see the court upholding strictly the
qualifier "in the province." As securities transactions become increas-
ingly detached from particular intraprovincial locations, it may become
clearer that provincial securities regulation is not confining itself to
operations "in the province." These cases do not indicate how the
Supreme Court would be likely to decide, but only that the qualifier "in
the province" merits substantive consideration.
61. Constitutional Law, supra note 54 under heading 15.9(f).
62. Edwards v. Canada (A.G.), [1930] A.C. 124 at 136, [1930] 1 D.L.R. 98 [hereinafter
Edwards].
63. (1992), 69 B.C.L.R. (2d) 171, 94 D.L.R. (4th) 339 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C.
refused (1992), 70 B.C.L.R. (2d) xxxii, 97 D.L.R. (4th) vii.
64. R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 418 [hereinafter the "B.C. Act"].
65. C.A. Sneed, "Awakening Canada's Dormant Trade and Commerce Clause: How Cana-
dian Courts Test Concurrent Provincial Legislation" (1997) 20 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
193 at 214-15.
66. The Constitution, supra note 20 at s. 92(14).
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Under any federal constitution, change is a given. The question, then,
is how will the distribution of powers respond to such change? There will
always be tension because when competence over a matter is differently
recognized, one level of government wins and another loses. Even if the
division of powers is not regarded as a strictly zero sum game, say by
recognizing concurrency, provinces still resent a perceived incursion into
their legislative competence. From the perspective of one of the levels of
government, sharing the field is less than occupying it.
In Global Securities, Southin J.A. argued in her dissent for a generous
interpretation of subsection 92(13) concerning the provincial power to
regulate securities by referring to Edwards and the living tree.67 This
reference is peculiar, given her originalist reference within the same
decision. What is interesting is that, given the inevitability of change,
invoking the theory in Global Securities does not particularly assist the
province. Redefining "person" to include women, as was the case in
Edwards, does not simultaneously deprive anyone else of anything. In
contrast, within a constitution that has distributed the totality of legisla-
tive power between two levels of government, giving a particular power
to one level of government means denying it to the other, or at least
reducing that government's influence over a matter. The notion of the
living tree cannot be applied blindly, because Lord Sankey's phrase does
not consider what to do when one branch of the tree grows at the expense
of another branch. Clearly, then, merely citing Edwards is not enough.
Why should the provinces continue to regulate a matter that appears to
have grown beyond their capacity to regulate? Moreover, in a consider-
ation of subsection 91(2), the invocation probably assists the federal
government, as the living tree theory hardly seems to contemplate a dead
branch for trade and commerce.
What is necessary instead of a mere call for a living and changing
constitution is a frank discussion of the values at stake: why should a
matter remain within the legislative competence of the provinces? Why
might it not belong, instead, in federal jurisdiction? What are the policy
issues at stake? Recent case law concerning the trade and commerce and
p.o.g.g. powers shows the Supreme Court wrestling with these questions.
We would note that the Supreme Court is at liberty to consider
"external" data in characterizing securities for division of powers pur-
poses. While in recent years we are most familiar with the Court using
social science and other data in assessing reasonable justification under
section 1 of the Charter,68 the Court has done so in non-Charter cases,
67. Supra note 59 at 621-22.
68. See, for example, RJR, supra note 12.
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such as City National Leasing. Indeed, it is hard to see how the Court can
assess terms such as "provincial inability," as required in Crown
Zellerbach, without looking beyond the text of the Constitution itself and
the existing case law.
At the same time, however, the Court sometimes claims not to consider
such issues. In Ontario Hydro, Chief Justice Lamer attempted to exclude
certain concerns from constitutional analysis. He referred to "the com-
ments of McIntyre J., for the Court, in Reference re Upper Churchill
Water Rights Reversion Act, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 297, at p. 334: '... it is not
for this Court to consider the desirability of legislation from a social or
economic perspective where a constitutional issue is raised' ."69
We have suggested a principled approach to the constitutional analysis
when a matter has changed. In what follows, we contrast our explanation
with the reasoning of the Court.
III. Trade and commerce
The leading case of Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons divides subsec-
tion 91(2) into two branches, "regulation of trade in matters of interpro-
vincial concern and ... general regulation of trade affecting the whole
dominion.1 70 Since that time, the head of power has moved in and out of
favour; at one point the Privy Council almost dismissed it as an ancillary
power without substance.7 Before determining the constitutional valid-
69. Supra note 11 at 358.
70. (1881), 7 A.C. 96 at 113 (P.C.) [hereinafter Parsons].
71. See Canada (A.G.) v. Alberta (A.G.), [1916] 1 A.C. 588, 10 W.W.R. 405 (P.C.)
[hereinafter Insurance Reference] (trade and commerce not saving licensing regime for
insurance companies other than provincial companies operating wholly within the province);
Re Board of Commerce Act, [ 1922] 1 A.C. 191 at 198,60 D.L.R. 513 (P.C.) [hereinafter Board
of Commerce] (trade and commerce not saving anti-combines provisions, the trade and
commerce power being merely ancillary to other federal powers); Toronto Electric Commis-
sioners v. Snider, [ 1925] A.C. 396, [1925] 1 W.W.R. 785 (P.C.) [hereinafter Snider] (trade and
commerce viewed again as merely ancillary, so not saving federal labour laws); Proprietary
Articles Trade Association v. Canada (A.G.), [1931] A.C. 310 at 326, [1931] 2 D.L.R. I (P.C.)
[hereinafter P.A.T.A.] (upholding anti-combines law under s. 91(27) but repudiating in obiter
the ancillary theory on s. 91(2)); British Columbia (A.G.) v. Canada (A.G.), [1937] A.C. 377,
[ 1937] 1 D.L.R. 691 (P.C.) [hereinafter Natural Products] (marketing schemes invalid under
general trade and commerce as some transactions targeted could be completed within the
province); Canadian Federation ofAgriculture v. Quebec (A.G.), [195 11 1 A.C. 179, [1950]
4 D.L.R. 689 (P.C.) [hereinafter Margarine Reference] (margarine legislation invalid because
certain transactions proscribed could be completed within a province).
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ity of a federal securities regime, therefore, the Supreme Court would
have to decide whether subsection 9 1(2) has any substance at all, and if
so, what that substance should be. In MacDonaldv. Vapor Canada,72 the
Supreme Court reversed the Federal Court of Appeal's holding that "a
law laying down a set of general rules as to the conduct of business men
in their competitive activities in Canada" fell validly within the general
category of trade and commerce.73 Despite finding the impugned legis-
lation invalid, however, Chief Justice Laskin did suggest some circum-
stances where the trade and commerce power would be available.74
Following these suggestions, the Supreme Court has upheld the im-
pugned competition legislation in City National Leasing and it seems that
subsection 9 1(2) indeed has independent substance.
1. Interprovincial trade and commerce
Parliament's power to regulate securities trading that is interprovincial is
not in question. Dickson J. (as he then was) has said in obiter:
I should not wish ... to affect prejudicially the constitutional right of
Parliament to enact a general scheme of securities legislation pursuant to
its power to make laws in relation to interprovincial and export trade and
commerce. This is of particular significance considering the interprovin-
cial and indeed international character of the securities industry.75
Professors Anisman and Hogg wrote that, despite the breadth of the
words used in Parsons and the Supreme Court's "recent tendency to read
life into them, the traditional and still dominant analytic approach,
including the 'flow of commerce' rubric, rests on a transactional analysis
of the legislation-that is, on whether tangible goods or commodities
physically cross a provincial border as a result of a transaction . "..."76
Securities are choses in action. Nevertheless, they are generally treated as
commodities transactions.77 Anisman and Hogg outlined a number of
arguments for the interprovincial character of much of securities activ-
ity.78 They noted, however, that most secondary trading consists of
72. [ 1977] 2 S.C.R. 134, 66 D.L.R. (3d) I [hereinafter Vapor Canada].
73. [1972] F.C. 1156 at 1171, 33 D.L.R. (3d) 434 (C.A.).
74. Vapor Canada, supra note 72 at 156ff.
75. Multiple Access, supra note 27 at 173.
76. "Constitutional Aspects," supra note 55 at 159 [footnotes omitted].
77. Ibid.
78. For example, since corporate securities are created and issued in the issuer's province of
incorporation, it is arguable that all transactions in which the securities issued end in the hands
of an ultimate purchaser in a different province are interprovincial: ibid. at 160.
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intraprovincial transactions and would be beyond the scope of any federal
legislation valid under this power.7 9
We submit that the intraprovincial nature of many securities trades is
sustained only artificially by legislative registration requirements. For
example, when an individual in Alberta walks into her bank branch and
buys units of that bank's proprietary mutual funds, a transaction of
intraprovincial trade occurs. The transaction is intraprovincial because
legislation requires that the bank or its securities dealing subsidiary
register in each province where it trades. The head office of the bank,
however, is likely in Montreal or Toronto. The computer system, which
is where, as much as it is anywhere, the transaction actually exists, may
be based in Oakville or Winnipeg. Where does this transaction really take
place? It is clearly not an intraprovincial trade transaction in the same way
as buying a tangible good in a store located within one province. As
technology continues to alter the securities markets, the legal insistence
on the intraprovinciality of individual trades becomes increasingly ab-
surd.
In response to such arguments, the provinces might argue that the
Privy Council repeatedly rejected federal legislation regulating particular
trades as ultra vires, even when over 80 percent of the commodity in
question was destined not merely for interprovincial but instead interna-
tional trade.80 Accordingly, the branch of interprovincial trade is prob-
ably incapable of sustaining general regulation of the securities markets;
rather, the general branch holds more potential.
2. General trade and commerce: City National Leasing
Even though subsection 91(2) had been consistently rejected as a support
for federal policies of economic regulation,8 in 1978 Professors Anisman
and Hogg believed the power sufficient to uphold federal legislation
regulating all aspects of the market that are of any more than provincial
significance.82 In 1989, the Supreme Court in City National Leasing
upheld the impugned Combines Investigation Act83 under subsection
79. Ibid. at 160-61.
80. R. v. Eastern Terminal Elevator Co., [1925] S.C.R. 434, [1925] 3 D.L.R. I [hereinafter
Eastern Terminal Elevator].
81. See ibid.; see also Insurance Reference, Board of Commerce, Snider, Natural Products,
Margarine Reference, all supra note 71. But see Ontario (A.G.) v. Canada (A.G.) (Canada
Standard Trade Mark), [1937] A.C. 405, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 702 (P.C.).
82. "Constitutional Aspects", supra note 55 at 171. See generally the discussion at 161-71.
83. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23, now the Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34.
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91(2),84 thus breaking the line of federal schemes that had failed under
that provision. Anti-combines legislation had previously been upheld
under the criminal law power. 85 In a sense, then, the reliance on subsec-
tion 91(2) is even more notable as it represents a choice to use the general
trade and commerce power instead of the criminal law power.
Referring to Laskin C.J. in Vapor Canada, Dickson C.J. wrote:
Chief Justice Laskin... proposed three hallmarks of validity for legislation
under the second branch of the trade and commerce power. First, the
impugned legislation must be part of a general regulatory scheme. Second,
the scheme must be monitored by the continuing oversight of a regulatory
agency. Third, the legislation must be concerned with trade as a whole
rather than with a particular industry .... By limiting the means which
federal regulators may employ to that of a regulatory scheme overseen by
a regulatory agency, and by limiting the object of federal legislation to
trade as a whole, these requirements attempt to maintain a delicate
balance between federal and provincial power.6
To these elements, Dickson C.J. added two more: "(i) the legislation
should be of a nature that the provinces jointly or severally would be
constitutionally incapable of enacting; and (ii) the failure to include one
or more provinces or localities in a legislative scheme would jeopardize
the successful operation of the scheme in other parts of the country." 7 He
continued:
In total, the five factors provide a preliminary checklist of characteristics,
the presence of which in legislation is an indication of validity under the
trade and commerce power. These indicia do not, however, represent an
exhaustive list of traits that will tend to characterize general trade and
commerce legislation. Nor is the presence or absence of any of these five
criteria necessarily determinative.8"
These five factors, none of which need be present, and which together do
not constitute an exhaustive list, are clearly not a strict legal test. The two
Chief Justices were not engaged in an exercise of purely legal reasoning.
Indeed, Laskin C.J.'s words emphasized above show that he was keenly
aware he was addressing the balance in the distribution of powers.
Dickson C.J. was also aware that the criteria left the Supreme Court ample
84. Dickson C.J. set out a helpful history of the trade and commerce power: see supra note
9 at 655-63.
85. P.A.T.A., supra note 71; Canada (A.G.) v. Canadian National Transportation, [198312
S.C.R. 206, 3 D.L.R. (4th) 16 [hereinafter Canadian National Transport] (Laskin C.J.
assuming that the Combines Investigation Act rests solely on the criminal law power for
analysis of the Attorney-General of Canada's power to prosecute criminal offences).
86. City National Leasing, supra note 9 at 661 [emphasis added].
87. Supra note 9 at 662. Dickson J. (as he then was) had first introduced these two factors
when writing for the minority in Canadian National Transport, supra note 85.
88. City National Leasing, supra note 9 at 662-63.
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flexibility.89 Through analysis of the City National Leasing decision and
by applying the Laskin-Dickson test to a federal securities act, we shall
discuss what the Supreme Court was doing by devising such character-
istics.
a. A general regulatory scheme
The Laskin test asks whether the impugned legislation is part of a
regulatory scheme. From the analysis in City National Leasing, it is clear
that what matters is not that the legislation be part of a regulatory scheme,
but rather that it introduce and implement such a scheme. This aspect of
federal securities legislation is not contentious. Dickson C.J.'s assess-
ment of the anti-combines regulatory regime applies closely to one for
securities: "[T]hese three components, elucidation of prohibited conduct,
creation of an investigatory procedure, and the establishment of a
remedial mechanism, constitute a well-integrated scheme of regulation
designed to discourage forms of commercial behaviour viewed as detri-
mental to Canada and the Canadian economy." 90 These components
would clearly be present in federal legislation resembling the Ontario
Act.
b. Oversight of a regulatory agency
Dickson C.J.'s analysis in City National Leasing conflates the first two
of Laskin C.J.'s criteria. Similarly, concerning securities, if legislation is
going to pass the first test, that of being part of a general regulatory
scheme at all, it is likely to pass the regulatory oversight test. Federal
legislation, certainly if based on the Ontario Act, would delegate author-
ity to a national securities commission.
c. Trade as a whole
This criterion follows naturally from the decision in Parsons that subsec-
tion 91(2) did not include the power to regulate by legislation the
contracts of a particular business or trade, in that case insurance. 9' Recent
decisions have generally been consistent.92 Dickson J. agreed with the
89. Canadian National Transport, supra note 85 at 268.
90. City National Leasing, supra note 9 at 676.
91. Parsons, supra note 70 at 113.
92. Dickson C.J. commented that legislation found ultra vires in Labatt Breweries of Canada
v. Canada (A.G.), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 914, 110 D.L.R. (3d) 594 [hereinafter Labatt Breweries],
regulated a single trade or industry: City National Leasing, supra note 9 at 678.
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"careful case by case assessment" in Parsons and emphasized that the
object of the legislation be "genuinely a national economic concern and
not just a collection of local ones.'"'9
We suggest that analysis of the Canadian securities markets as simply
a co-existence of separate local industries is myopic. Such analysis
focuses on individual transactions, not on the effect of the collective
activity of securities market participants. Despite the popular term
"securities industry," ensuring the integrity of the markets and the
availability of capital to businesses and of investment opportunities to
individuals is much more than a single industry. It is not merely that many
people and businesses across Canada participate in their local securities
markets. Many products, including light beer,94 are consumed widely
across the country, but fail to surpass their particularity to be classified as
"general." Rather, the securities markets form an integral part of the
infrastructure of the Canadian economy. The provision of capital is more
central to the broad spectrum of businesses than are other suppliers. Even
if most companies purchase insurance of various kinds, insurance is not
their lifeblood the way capital is. Hogg wrote that the capacity to raise
capital is an essential attribute of corporate status;95 we suggest that it is
an essential part of the Canadian economy.
During this era of globalization, world markets are organized on
national levels. Citing Parsons, an insurance licensing decision from
1881, hardly responds to this reality. Whether individual provinces
realize it or not, Canadian markets are perceived as a national unity by
international markets. Exchange rates and interest rates and levels of
foreign investment are determined nationally, not provincially. It is on
these points that a court could distinguish securities from areas of
commerce that have also been affected substantially by globalization and
developments in technology. Securities is part of the economic frame-
work of the nation that we see recognized under Parliament in section
91.96 There are few, if any, other areas of commerce that could be
characterized similarly, so securities would not merely be the first of
many areas to fall to Parliament under a reassessment of the division of
powers. The provinces would not need to fear a much broader expansion
of federal power based on our argument.
93. Canadian National Transport, supra note 85 at 268.
94. See Labatt Breweries, supra note 92.
95. Constitutional Law, supra note 54 under heading 2 1. 10(a), discussing Manitoba Securi-
ties, supra note 25.
96. See Abel, supra note 59.
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The decision in City National Leasing is important because the
characterization of competition applies also to securities markets. Dickson
C.J. wrote: "The deleterious effects of anti-competitive practices tran-
scend provincial boundaries. Competition is not an issue of purely local
concern but one of crucial importance for the national economy."97 The
efficient flow of capital is also of crucial importance for the national
economy. It is possible to replace "competition" with "securities" in a
way that is not possible with specific industries. More interesting, though,
is Chief Justice Dickson's sleight of hand when he introduces p.o.g.g.
language into the assessment of generality. "Particular" is not the antith-
esis of "nationally important"; indeed, many of the matters under provin-
cial jurisdiction, such as education, are tremendously important for the
national economy. Once Dickson draws in the language of importance,
parallels between competition and securities become clear.
In City National Leasing, the Attorney-General of Quebec had argued
that the regulation of competition in its intraprovincial dimension does
not fall within the federal jurisdiction. Quebec submitted that the prov-
inces have an important role to play in local competition laws and, in fact,
that both the Civil Code9" and the common law have already provided
some remedies for unfair competition.99 Consequently, the federal legis-
lation should be read down and limited to interprovincial matters.
Dickson C.J., however, accepted counter-arguments not only that the
impugned Act was "meant to cover intraprovincial trade, but that it must
do so if it is to be effective." 1°° Dickson C.J. summarized: "Because
regulation of competition is so clearly of national interest and because
competition cannot be successfully regulated by federal legislation
which is restricted to interprovincial trade, the Quebec argument must
fail."1°1 This development is astonishing, and breathes considerable life
into subsection 9 1(2). Here Chief Justice Dickson suggested that it is the
very intention to deal with intraprovincial trade that somehow validates
the initiative, as if merely wanting to cover intraprovincial trade is
enough. The comment suggests that there is scope for a federal initiative
to affect intraprovincial trade in a substantive way if concurrent with a
valid exercise of power over interprovincial trade. Moreover, it was not
an answer for Quebec to say that successful regulation of competition
could be achieved by a combination of federal regulation of interprovin-
cial trade and provincial regulation of interprovincial trade.
97. City National Leasing, supra note 9 at 678 [emphasis added].
98. Civil Code of Lower Canada, now the Civil Code of Quebec.
99. City National Leasing, supra note 9 at 680-81.
100. Supra note 9 at 681 [emphasis added].
101. Supranote9.
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Professors Anisman and Hogg suggested that federal regulation would
not treat securities as a particular trade. "A federal securities act would be
directed not at a particular business or trade in the provinces but rather at
the capital-raising function by issuers throughout Canada and would be
designed to facilitate the allocational efficiency of the primary market,
the capital-raising mechanism, by increasing investor confidence in the
securities market generally."' 2 At the time, they noted that it might be
difficult to include regulation of secondary distributions, as this segment
of the industry does not deal directly with the movement of fresh
capital.'03 Yet Anisman and Hogg also wrote, "As the securities market
underlies commercial activities throughout the country, the interprovin-
cial or transprovincial impact of the primary and secondary markets is
theoretically and practically clear."" Moreover, the failed Quebec
argument in City National Leasing seems to resolve this issue in favour
of federal regulation: because national regulation of the securities mar-
kets cannot be accomplished without regulating intraprovincial trade,
such intraprovincial regulation by the federal government is necessary. In
a matter such as competition, claiming that the subject matter is severable
into interprovincial and intraprovincial halves does not matter. Post-City
National Leasing, legislation specifically aimed at intraprovincial trade
alone would be problematic, but a general initiative targeting both
branches should be possible.
d. Provincial (in)capability
As Dickson C.J.'s analysis in City National Leasing demonstrates, the
final two criteria are closely related. The question whether the provinces
are themselves constitutionally capable of enacting the impugned legis-
lation requires careful analysis; the bar for finding them incapable must
not be set too high. Dickson C.J. wrote "jointly or severally,"'0 5 but we
suggest that this phrase needs to be defined carefully to mean less than all
the provinces. If not, if the question is indeed meant to include the
possibility of unanimous joint action by the provinces, the general power
for trade and commerce and the residual powers would be entirely
eliminated. Nothing would ever be considered to fall beyond the scope of
the provinces. Surely the provinces, if they cooperated fully, could
regulate the National Capital Region, and competition, areas that have
been found to fall under federal competence either by p.o.g.g. or by trade
102. "Constitutional Aspects," supra note 55 at 165-66.
103. Supra note 55 at 169.
104. Supra note 55 at 168.
105. City National Leasing, supra note 9 at 662; see Part 111(2) above.
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and commerce; 106 indeed, the first example would require cooperation by
only two provinces, Ontario and Quebec. In City National Leasing, it was
argued that competition could not be regulated on the provincial level
because companies could move easily to a neighbouring province with
less stringent anti-competitive rules. Yet, while this problem could be
solved by unanimous provincial agreement on identical legislation, anti-
competitive measures passed Dickson C.J.'s test. We take the decision in
City National Leasing to mean that, in a matter of general trade and
commerce, Parliament has legislative competence even if all the prov-
inces together could address the problem.
Even if securities legislation is characterized legally as a local,
intraprovincial matter of transactions, there are arguments that one
province's refusal to regulate or failure to regulate effectively would
affect others. In part, this is because a perception exists, irrespective of
what courts determine, that securities are national in scope. For example,
given that Canadians think of their markets as national, a regulatory gap
in one province that permitted a serious scandal in the securities business
might well depress investor confidence across the country. A major
scandal in any province affects Canadian investor confidence much more
than one in the United States or in Mexico. The scandal of Bre-X Minerals
Ltd. ("Bre-X"), a regulatory failure on the part of Ontario regulators,
comes readily to mind. "Observers familiar with the junior mining sector
say it's impossible to overestimate how damaging [the] Bre-X Minerals
Ltd. gold mining scam has been to investor psychology."'°7 Clearly, such
a major scandal in one province can tarnish the reputation and reduce
market confidence not only in respect of that province, but also of other
provinces. For example, while Bre-X was listed on The Toronto Stock
Exchange, the scandal clearly hurt the Vancouver Stock Exchange: "The
[Vancouver] exchange saw turnover slump and prices drop to 12-month
lows after Bre-X Minerals Ltd.'s Busang gold debacle in Indonesia."108
A provincial regulator's failure also harms Canada as a whole, viewed on
the international scene: "The Bre-X meltdown has badly tarnished the
image of Canadian stock markets and securities regulators with interna-
tional investors. In the wake of such a colossal embarrassment, the
106. See, respectively, Munro v. National Capital Commission, [1966] S.C.R. 663, 57
D.L.R. (2d) 753; City National Leasing, supra note 9.
107. P. Kennedy, "Major Players Gift Lift to Miners" The Globe and Mail (21 December
1998) B 1.
108. "VSE Campaign Woos Foreign Investors" The Globe and Mail (26 June 1997) B4
(emphasis added); "Bre-X Minerals Ltd. shares never traded on the Vancouver Stock
Exchange, but the company's scandalous collapse in mid-March still haunts the exchange,
which is fuelled by demand for speculative resource stocks" ("VSE Continues to Suffer from
Skepticism Over Resource Shares" The Globe and Mail (3 June 1997) B5).
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foreign press is characterizing Canada as a kind of regulatory Wild West,
where frauds such as Bre-X can flourish." 109 Bre-X is not the only
regulatory lapse by Ontario to have harmed investor confidence and
market reputations in the other provinces. 10
The identity of the province designated for the hypothetical test is
critical. At the end of the day, less than optimal regulation in, say,
Newfoundland is not going to prevent other provinces entirely from
regulating their own intraprovincial transactions. On the other hand,
failure to regulate effectively in Ontario, where the great majority of the
country's securities transactions occur, would unquestionably affect
every other province. Ontario-based securities dealers must register in
other provinces, and to that extent they must meet the standards in those
provinces. If, however, the core businesses of such dealers were unregu-
lated or ineffectively regulated in Ontario, investors and businesses
seeking capital across the country would be harmed. The tests concerning
109. J. Heinzl, "The Bre-X Scandal: TSE President Defends Handling of Fiasco" The Globe
and Mail (7 May 1997) B 1 [emphasis added]. "And because Canada's reputation has been
tarnished by the gold mine fraud, exploration funding may swing toward London" (M. Hayes,
"OSC Mines for Investor Confidence: Hopes That Tougher Controls Will Help the Resource
Sector After the Bre-X Scandal" The Globe and Mail (18 June 1998) B27 [emphasis added]);
"The scam cost shareholders $3 billion and tarnished Canada's reputation as a world leader in
the mining industry" ("TSE Study Demands Tougher Regulations to Halt Second Bre-X"
Winnipeg Free Press (3 February 1999) B5 [emphasis added]). See, generally, "TSE's Bre-X
Report Urges Tighter Rules" The Lethbridge Herald (3 February 1999) 6; "TSE Tightens Rules
for Mining Interests" Winnipeg Free Press (21 August 1998) B8; K. Howlett, "Tougher Rules
Urged for Miners: Ontario Regulators Call for Better Drilling Disclosure, Standards for
Analysts in Wake of Bre-X Fraud" The Globe and Mail (9 June 1998) BI; B. Tannock,
"Barroom Dreams" The Globe and Mail (26 September 1997) P44; S. Northfield, "Investors
Lower Their Sights" The Globe and Mail (24 September 1997) B 18; "Stockbrokers Urged to
Adopt Tough New Disclosure Rules" Winnipeg Free Press (19 September 1997) B5; B.
Milner, "Caveat Emptor at Mining Show: While Some Keen Investors Are Snapping Up Junior
Stocks at Bargain Basement Prices, Others Look But Don't Touch Following the Bre-X
Debacle" The Globe and Mail (31 May 1997) B9; A. Barnes, "Interest Rate Jitters Plague
Stocks" The Globe and Mail (29 May 1997) B 17; J. McFarland, "Bre-X Fiasco Not Result of
Regulatory Flaw But Watchdogs to Review Mining Finances" The Globe and Mail (16 May
1997) B3; J. Partridge, "IDA Chief Urges Calm in Regulators' Response" The Globe and Mail
(14 May 1997) B3; B. McKenna, "Bre-X Debacle Spurs Clamour for Overall Securities
Regulator" The Globe and Mail (7 May 1997) B8; J. McFarland, "Bre-X Plummets in Record
Trading" The Globe andMail (7 May 1997) B 1; D. Goold, "Bre-X Fiasco a Market Watershed"
The Globe andMail (6 May 1997) B 1; K. Howlett, "The Bre-X Scandal: Institutional Investors
Criticize TSE 'Gambling' The Globe and Mail (6 May 1997) B 10; A. Bell, "Bay Street Nurses
Black Eye" The Globe and Mail (6 May 1997) B 11; V. Lawton, "Bre-X Samples False" The
Globe andMail (5 May 1997) A 1; M. Stinson, "Bre-X Debacle Devastates Mining Shares" The
Globe and Mail (28 March 1997) B 12; A. Willis, "The Bre-X Saga" The Globe and Mail (28
March 1997) B 1; J. Saunders et al., "Bre-X's Woes Panic Markets" The Globe and Mail (27
March 1997) Al.
110. See, for example, P. Waldie, "Mob Boss Picked Canadian Exchanges for YBM Scam"
The Globe and Mail (8 June 1999) B 1; K. Howlett & P. Waldie, "OSC Had Concerns About
YBM for a Year Before Crackdown" The Globe and Mail (8 February 1999) B 1.
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provincial incapability or inability do not specify which province would
be capable ofjeopardizing the other provinces' efforts; the tests do not ask
about removing the province least involved in the matter. Thus we must
accept the possibility that Ontario would be that non-participating prov-
ince.
This question of Ontario's market dominance raises other provincial
capability concerns. Securities regulators in other provinces routinely
defer to the Ontario Securities Commission in many regards; in a sense,
the OSC functions as a de facto national regulator, exercising extra-
territorial influence. While the other provincial securities commissions,
their own powers delegated to them by elected legislative assemblies,
make decisions to follow Ontario's lead, and are accountable to the
electorates for those decisions, we suggest that this situation is problem-
atic. We submit that one province so dominating the others and so
routinely dictating regulatory policy in a matter of so-called provincial
legislative authority is not in line with the objectives of Canadian
federalism, such as diversity. Competitive federalism would have prov-
inces adopting from their neighbours the policies that prove most effi-
cient in practice; the concept is not that other provinces routinely follow
the same province in regulating a given matter. Given Ontario's unelected
dominance on the basis of its market share, it is arguable that it would be
preferable for securities regulation to be federal: federal regulation could
potentially be more accountable to the various regions than is Ontario and
could perhaps better accommodate regional aspirations and concerns.
Furthermore, we suggest that analysis of the securities markets should
build on the characterization of securities markets as more than a
particular industry. In this way, the question is not whether one province's
refusal to regulate its own intraprovincial securities transactions impedes
another province's ability to do the same thing within its own borders.
The question becomes whether one province's refusal to regulate its
portion of the national securities markets prevents Canadians in other
provinces from having an effective system of national regulation. Given
how, particularly in light of globalizing forces, securities markets are
viewed nationally, this question is appropriate. Clearly, one province's
refusal to regulate would stop Canadians within that province, and also
in the rest of Canada, from having their securities markets regulated
effectively at the national level.
The high degree of interprovincial cooperation that the CSA are trying
to achieve and maintain is significant."' These initiatives indicate that
11. Brown, supra note 22.
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the provincial regulators recognize that securities in this country can no
longer be regulated effectively by the individual provinces. We also
suggest that such initiatives are likely to prove ultimately inadequate in
dealing with the growing transprovincial, global pressures on securities
markets. Such cooperation relies fully on interprovincial, intergovern-
mental cooperation, and even when this cooperation exists, the CSA's
processes are necessarily cumbersome insofar as it takes thirteen authori-
ties, even working together, much longer to approve changes than a single
regulator. Given the pace of change in the industry, regulation cannot be
effective unless it, too, is capable of changing quickly.
Even if this cooperative provincial regulation were to be effective,
which we suggest it is not, we argue that it exceeds the appropriate
"natural limits," to use the Edwards term, of Canadian federalism.
Provincial cooperation to regulate jointly matters that the provinces
would otherwise be incapable of so treating effectively operates as a pan-
Canadian legislative and regulatory power distinct from, if not in oppo-
sition to, the Dominion. We would note that the marketing scheme upheld
in Reference Re Agricultural Products Marketing Act, 1970' 12 related to
delegation of authority by one level of government to another and to
cooperative federalism between the federal and provincial governments.
In that sense it is immediately distinguishable from provincial regulation
that is only possible by cooperation between the provinces and that sets
up the united provinces against the federal government.
In City National Leasing, Dickson C.J. quoted with approval the
following syllogism by Professors Hogg and Grover:
[R]egulation of the competitive sector of the economy can be effectively
accomplished only by federal action. If there is no federal power to enact
a competition policy, then Canada cannot have a competition policy. The
consequence of a denial of federal constitutional power is, therefore, in
practical effect, a gap in the distribution of legislative powers." 3
The test for provincial inability must, of course, rely on an assumption as
to what the underlying goal is: in other words, the ability to do what? In
City National Leasing, the Court assumed that the goal was to provide a
nationally consistent regulatory regime for competition: "[R]egulation of
the competitive sector of the economy can be effectively accomplished
only by federal action." Had the Court made all its assumptions explicit,
it would have said: National regulation of the competitive sector of the
economy can be effectively accomplished only by federal action. From
112. [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198, 84 D.L.R. (3d) 257.
113. Hogg & Grover, supra note 60 at 200, quoted in City National Leasing, supra note 9 at
683.
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there, the finding of provincial inability is a foregone conclusion-of
course one province's non-cooperation would jeopardize the national
regime. Had the Court initially assumed that the objective was to create
provincially effective anti-competition regimes, allowing provinces to
define their own diverse approaches to economic intervention, the Court
would, presumably, have found the provinces perfectly able to regulate
competition. Insofar as inability is a function ofothe assumptions as to
precisely which ability is at issue, we suggest that the outcome of the
provincial inability requirement depends on a policy decision vis-a-vis
the best level for the regulation of a matter.
It was noted in City National Leasing that provincial anti-competition
regulation would not solve the problem because companies could easily
relocate to a neighbouring province with lower standards. It was not
noted, however, that even with national regulation, companies can still
move to the United States or Mexico. In a sense, then, even Parliament has
a kind of incapability with respect to competition. Thus City National
Leasing does not stand for the proposition that matters must be governed
at the level that can regulate them perfectly. Rather, while the Court is
constrained by the Constitution, its interpretation of that Constitution
sometimes includes, when deciding which level of government is going
to have competence, choosing the better of two imperfect capabilities.
This reasoning applies equally to the regulation of securities markets. In
a global context in which capital permeates all borders, Parliament has the
better, albeit imperfect, capability to regulate securities markets.
3. Conclusion
We suggest that the Court is developing the tests in Vapor Canada and
City National Leasing to give itself the discretion to monitor the distribu-
tion of powers in the field of commerce. Given that the list of traits is
neither exhaustive nor determinative, it is clear that the Court is not
restricting itself, but rather reserving power for itself. While there are
countless matters that could only be regulated nationally by all the
provinces or by Parliament, we submit that the selection of securities
markets would be in line with the decision in City National Leasing and
Abel's understanding of the original scheme of sections 91 and 92.
The case that this trade and commerce power could sustain federal
securities legislation is stronger now than when Anisman and Hogg
wrote. Dickson C.J. wished, by using his criteria combined with Laskin
C.J.'s, to "maintain a delicate balance between federal and provincial
power."' "4 We would argue, however, that, given the current nature of the
114. City National Leasing, supra note 9 at 661.
280 The Dalhousie Law Journal
securities markets and their pan-Canadian significance, the exclusive
power to regulate securities is not one that is appropriately provincial. It
is not one that provides some of the benefits intended to accrue from local
control.1 1 5 Acknowledging federal power in this regard, exclusive or
merely concurrent but substantial and with recourse to paramountcy,
should not upset any legitimate delicate balance.
IV. The p.o.g.g. power
The power of Parliament to legislate with respect to the peace, order, and
good government of Canada has been judicially interpreted to cover
matters of "national concern."'"1 6 Le Dain J. for the majority of the
Supreme Court in Crown Zellerbach approved Beetz J.' s reasoning in the
Reference ReAnti-Inflation"7 to establish the current test for application
of the p.o.g.g. power's national dimensions branch. " 8 The p.o.g.g. power
is residual, and will only be considered as support for an impugned federal
law once no specific federal head of power applies." 9 The p.o.g.g. power
would only be required to justify a federal securities act if the argument
above for the trade and commerce power failed. Unlike jurisdiction based
on enumerated section 91 powers, which may be concurrent with provin-
cial jurisdiction, the power conferred by the national concern branch of
p.o.g.g. is exclusive'20 and includes intraprovincial aspects.'12 This
capacity of the federal government to sweep up previously provincial
powers has worried some commentators who find it an unacceptable
extension of the reasoning in the Anti-Inflation Reference.'22 Unlike the
emergency branch of p.o.g.g., the effect of national concern is a perma-
nent allocation of jurisdiction over a matter. If the national concern
doctrine supported a federal securities regime, existing provincial rules
would be rendered invalid, not merely inoperative (as by paramountcy),
115. See, contra, Tse, supra note 5.
116. Viscount Simon developed the modern elaboration of the national concern branch in
Ontario (A.G.) v. Canada Temperance Foundation, [1946] A.C. 193, [1946] 2 D.L.R. I at 5:
"[I]f [the subject matter] is such that it goes beyond local or provincial concern or interests and
must from its inherent nature be the concern of the Dominion as a whole... then it will fall
within the competence of the Dominion Parliament as a matter affecting the peace, order and
good government of Canada, though it may in another aspect touch on matters specially
reserved to the provincial legislatures." P.o.g.g. also includes the emergency branch and the
"gap" branch: see Constitutional Law, supra note 54 under heading 17.1.
117. [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 452 [hereinafter Anti-Inflation Reference].
118. For more recent considerations of the national dimensions branch, see Ontario Hydro,
supra note 11; RJR, supra note 12; Hydro-Quibec, supra note 13.
119. Constitutional Law, supra note 54 under heading 17. 1.
120. Hydro-Qudbec, supra note 13 at 288.
121. Crown Zellerbach, supra note 10 at 432-33.
122. See, for example, H. Brun & G. Tremblay, Droit Constitutionnel, 3d ed. (Cowansville,
Qc: Yvon Blais, 1997) at 559.
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or inapplicable (as by inter-jurisdictional immunity). This is simply the
effect of the national concern's exclusive character. 23
1. The test in Crown Zellerbach: function and significance
The test developed for the p.o.g.g. power in Crown Zellerbach, like that
for general trade and commerce in City National Leasing, is more flexible
and policy-driven than it appears. The elaborate requirements of "single-
ness," "indivisibility," "national significance," and "provincial inability"
are not clear legal categories that admit of deductive application. On the
contrary, they are devices that allow courts to engage in case-by-case
analyses of the effect of a matter's characterization on the fundamental
division of powers. Professors Brun and Tremblay have decried this
flexibility, fearing that it inevitably favours Parliament: "Tous ces
pseudo-crit~res impliquent une 6valuation politique que la Cour ne
cherche meme pas A faire: ils sont destin6s i 8tre laiss6s en ddfinitive A
1'appr6ciation du gouvernement central. Pire, on peut drmontrer que
plusieurs de ces crit~res sont de simples paravents.' 24 Such fears are
founded on their assumption that the Supreme Court is inclined to
centralize power. Subsequent argument, however, shows that the "pro-
vincial inability" criteria, for example, can be used to allow provinces to
cooperate in respect of some matters that have grown beyond their local
nature. The flexibility in the test for national concern allows a court to
assess the balance of powers-a process that may benefit provincial
legislatures as well as Parliament.
The national concern branch may apply to a matter that was primarily
of a local or private nature but which has subsequently evolved into one
of national concern. 125 The national importance of a matter, however, is
not a sufficient condition for the deployment of the p.o.g.g. power. In the
Anti-Inflation Reference, Beetz J. insisted that the subject matter must
have "a degree of unity that makes it indivisible, an identity which makes
it distinct from provincial matters and a sufficient consistence to retain the
bounds of form.' l2 6 Later, Le Dain J. added the requirement of "distinc-
tiveness" and pointed explicitly to its role in preserving an equilibrium in
the federal distribution of powers. He wrote: "For a matter to qualify as
a matter of national concern ... it must have a singleness, distinctiveness
and indivisibility that clearly distinguishes it from matters of provincial
123. Crown Zellerbach, supra note 10 at 433.
124. Supra note 122 at 561.
125. Crown Zellerbach, supra note 10 at 432.
126. Supra note 117 at 457- 58.
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concern and a scale of impact on provincial jurisdiction that is reconcil-
able with the fundamental distribution of legislative power under the
Constitution."'
27
Professor Hogg has argued that a "provincial inability" test is the most
important, even sufficient, condition for the use of the "national concern"
branch. He wrote that provincial inability is present where there is "a need
for one national law which cannot realistically be satisfied by cooperative
provincial action because the failure of one province to cooperate would
carry with it adverse consequences for the residents of other prov-
inces."'
28
Although Hogg's definition of provincial inability is consistent with
the case law and the logic of federalism, his analysis overstates the role
that provincial inability plays in the test for national dimensions as
elaborated in Crown Zellerbach. Le Dain J. wrote: "In the context of the
national concern doctrine of the peace, order and good government
power, its utility lies, in my opinion, in assisting in the determination
whether a matter has the requisite singleness or indivisibility from a
functional as well as a conceptual point of view."' 29 As provincial
inability is only one indicator of indivisibility, it is theoretically open for
a court to find that a nationally important, distinct matter falls under
federal jurisdiction under the national concern branch even though the
provinces are able to regulate that matter.
Professor Baier has noted the potential expansion of federal power that
may flow from this re-positioning of provincial inability in the national
concern test: "By applying provincial inability the way he did, Le Dain
robbed it of its initial, necessity-based, narrowing effect and opens doors
for national concern"; "[p]rovincial inability is the inch for centralists to
take a mile. ... " 3 0 The Supreme Court has acknowledged this danger in
the national concern branch of p.o.g.g. and has refrained from employing
p.o.g.g. in several subsequent cases."3 ' In Hydro-Quibec, La Forest J.
said that the application of the national concern power puts the matter
"within the exclusive and paramount power of Parliament and has
obvious impact on the balance of Canadian federalism."'3 2
127. Crown Zellerbach, supra note 10 at 432.
128. Constitutional Law, supra note 54 under heading 17.3(b).
129. Crown Zellerbach, supra note 10 at 434 [emphasis added].
130. G. Baier, "Tempering Peace, Order and Good Government: Provincial Inability and
Canadian Federalism" (1998) 9 N.J.C.L. 277 at 291, 305.
131. For example, RJR, supra note 12; Hydro-Quibec, supra note 13.
132. Supra note 13 at 288.
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It is not immediately clear why Le Dain J. would consider provincial
inability an indication of indivisibility. The answer must be that distinc-
tiveness does not only concern the nature of the matterper se (for we can
conceivably divide all matters into relationships between sub-matters or
group them under more general matters). Instead, "distinctiveness,"
"indivisibility" and "singleness" must refer to the potential effect that a
matter as within federal competence will have on the overall bundle of
provincial powers. In other words, the concern, particularly given the
exclusive, permanent nature of p.o.g.g., is that matters recognized under
this power not draw others with them. It is telling that Le Dain J.'s
exploration of the singleness and indivisibility of marine pollution is
summed up in a single paragraph, which concludes as follows:
Moreover, the distinction between salt water and fresh water as limiting
the application of the Ocean Dumping ControlAct meets the consideration
emphasized by a majority of this Court in the Anti-Inflation Act refer-
ence-that in order for a matter to qualify as one of national concern falling
within the federal peace, order and good government power it must have
ascertainable and reasonable limits, in so far as its impact on provincial
jurisdiction is concerned.133
As in the case of the general trade and commerce power, the various parts
of the test in Crown Zellerbach are therefore best seen as attempts to re-
describe in legal terms what is essentially a matter of judge-made policy:
while adapting to changing circumstances, the national concern branch of
p.o.g.g. must be "reconcilable with the fundamental distribution of
legislative power under the Constitution."
13 4
a. National significance, not merely "local or private"
In Crown Zellerbach, the Supreme Court noted that marine pollution (the
result of dumping) flows easily across provincial and state boundaries. 35
This overflow effect convinced Le Dain J. that the matter was not merely
local or private. On the arguments presented with respect to the generality
of securities markets, it is clear that the results of irregularities in
securities markets also flow across borders with ease.'36 Securities are
often traded on several markets simultaneously. A scandal in the securi-
ties trade in any province might detrimentally affect investor confidence
in Canadian markets generally. Securities markets are even less local than
marine pollution in that their geographical locale is to a great extent
notional. These markets are only fictionally "within the province" if they
133. Crown Zellerbach, supra note 10 at 437-38.
134. Supra note 10 at 432.
135. Supra note 10 at 436.
136. See discussion of provincial (in)capability above, Part III(2)(d).
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are anywhere at all. In short, securities markets constitute a matter with
the required national significance.137
b. Singleness, indivisibility, and distinctiveness
While it is apparent that singleness, indivisibility, and distinctiveness are
tools to limit the scope of the federal residual powers more than they are
legal characterizations, the courts have not abandoned them for an
explicit policy-based approach. It is appropriate, therefore, to consider
these adjectives both as applying to the matter and as proxies for
discussion of the appropriate balance to be struck between provincial and
federal powers. Proponents of continued provincial regulation of securi-
ties might insist that the matter is divisible into primary and secondary
markets. Yet we have already noted that the purposes of securities
regulation are the capitalization of business and the protection of inves-
tors. With respect to these aims, the distinction between primary and
secondary investors is insignificant. Moreover, a weakness in the second-
ary market for securities would certainly affect investor confidence in the
primary market. From the consumer's point of view, it is all one market.
And, while in other fields the consumer's perception might not be
relevant, with respect to securities, consumer perception and investor
confidence must stand at the core of the activity.
The distinctiveness test and its analogues are methods for courts to
promote their understandings of the "fundamental distribution of legis-
lative power."'3 s As we have argued in Part II above, upholding federal
securities regulation need not unbalance the federation. As we argued in
Part I, regulation of securities is a distinct and special matter. Recognizing
Parliament's ability to regulate securities would not cause a domino
effect. Such recognition need not bring with it recognition of power over
any other matter that has so far been recognized as a target of valid
provincial regulation. Provinces cannot adequately regulate securities
individually. Provincial regulation does not provide significant gains in
the values of federalism such as diversity or local control. Finally, as
argued in Parts II and III above, Parliament's jurisdiction in this matter
is consistent with a reasonable view of the division of economic regula-
tory powers.
137. In comparing regulation of securities with aquatic pollution, we limit our concerns to the
flow-over effects of a major problem. We do not address a possible race to the bottom in terms
of lax regulation: that notion is highly questionable. See Guthrie, supra note 42; Romano, supra
note 48.
138. Crown Zellerbach, supra note 10 at 432.
Taking Stock: Securities Markets and the Division of Powers
c. Provincial inability
The most cogent interpretation of the test for provincial inability in
Crown Zellerbach is that suggested by Hogg: provinces are unable to
regulate a matter if one province's non-cooperation would render the
scheme ineffective. 39 It is clearly untenable that provincial inability
arises only when all provinces acting in concert still could not regulate a
matter-such a view is antithetical to the notion of a residual power. The
arguments presented with respect to the test in Crown Zellerbach are
relevant here: it is clear that if Ontario did not cooperate with other
provinces, all provinces would be vulnerable to the effects of Canada's
largest securities market. 4° Provincial inability is not a determinative
component of the test in Crown Zellerbach, but rather an indicator of
distinctiveness that, in turn, stands in for balancing the powers amongst
the partners of the federation. The regulation of securities markets is a
matter that meets the provincial inability requirement, but even if it did
not, this would not be fatal to the use of the national concern branch of the
p.o.g.g. power.
2. Conclusion
It is likely that federal securities legislation would pass even the "high
threshold" '' set in Crown Zellerbach for finding jurisdiction under the
national concern branch of p.o.g.g. The consequences of uneven regula-
tion may easily flow across provincial boundaries. Securities markets
evince the requisite singleness or indivisibility. Provinces would be
unable to regulate securities effectively if a single key province did not
cooperate in a common scheme. Most important, however, Parliament's
power to regulate securities would be consistent with the economic
understanding of the constitutional division of powers. Despite this, the
mere use of the national concern branch of p.o.g.g. may be unbalancing
in itself. Therefore, this residual power should only be used if the general
trade and commerce power fails.
139. Constitutional Law, supra note 54 under heading 17.3(b).
140. See Part III(2)(d) above. Clearly, any elected government of Ontario probably has
enough self interest that it would be unlikely to gut its securities regulation to an extent that
other provinces would feel the effects. The test in Crown Zellerbach, however, asks about the
possible effects of one province's non-cooperation. The test does not ask about the probability
of such non-cooperation. After all, if society's controlling values were altered, it might be
assumed that no province would be likely to permit aquatic pollution.
141. Ontario Hydro, supra note II at 352.
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V. Banking
In 1978 Anisman and Hogg did not even discuss the banking power.
Hogg, however, has since provided banking as an example of an area
where the courts have applied progressive interpretation: the term is not
limited to the extent and kind of business conducted by banks in 1867.142
Anisman and Hogg could not have known that, less than a decade after
their paper, the Bank Act would be revised, effectively eliminating the
divisions between the four pillars of financial regulation. Even more than
some other terms, "banking" has no natural meaning; one legal dictionary
definition begins, "The business of banking, as defined by law and
custom. . . .143 In effect, banking is not even what bankers do-as a
definition that would be circular enough-but rather what legislatures
and courts say banks do.
The framers of the Constitution, in assigning banking to the federal
government, did not contemplate the present situation. They supposed
themselves to be assigning everything the banks did to Parliament; they
did not imagine that banks would provide commercial and consumer
loans, accept deposits and offer chequing accounts under federal legisla-
tion, and dominate the country's securities dealing under provincial
regulation. While discussion of the provincial power over securities often
emphasizes the intraprovincial character of many of the transactions so
regulated, the banking transactions contemplated in 1867 would have
been, for the most part, intraprovincial too. In other words, it was not the
relation of the transactions vis-ji-vis provincial boundaries that prompted
the assignment of subsection 91(15). In assigning banks to Parliament,
the framers were presumably concerned that the Dominion's financial
markets, as they then conceived of them, be safely regulated by one level
of government.
Were the Supreme Court starting over in interpreting the Constitution,
it might interpret banking more broadly to reflect what banks currently
do. Despite the banks' wide-reaching activities, however, it is unlikely
that subsection 91(15) would save a general federal act regulating
Canada's securities markets. Such a redefinition would be extreme, and
could cause considerable anxiety as to what the Supreme Court would
redefine next. In comparison with subsection 91(2) and the p.o.g.g.
national concern power, such redefinition has fewer juristic restrictions
on it and is less desirable from a perspective of balancing federal and
provincial powers.
142. Alberta (A. G.) v. Canada (A.G.) (Alberta Bill of Rights), [1947] A.C. 503 at 553 (P.C.).
Indeed, that "banking" has no substantive content has become a commonplace: Abel, supra
note 59 at 506.
143. Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed., s.v. "banking."
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VI. Criminal law
Anisman and Hogg considered whether the criminal law power might
sustain general securities legislation, and concluded that, at that time, it
would not.'" The most that they could contemplate in this area was that
a federal securities act might reproduce the existing Criminal Code
provisions associated with securities; the regulatory provisions would
have to be justified some other way.1
45
In subsequent years, the Supreme Court has interpreted the criminal
law power liberally, 146 and has shown greater tolerance for regulatory
criminal provisions. La Forest J. wrote, "As noted by Lamer C.J. in R. v.
Swain... 'it has long been recognised that there also exists a preventative
branch of the criminal law power.""'1 47 He also quoted Estey J. in Labatt
Breweries, who, while "finding a detailed regulatory scheme with respect
to production and content standards for malt liquor... [said] 'That there
is an area of legitimate regulations in respect of trade practices contrary
to the interest of the community such as misleading, false or deceptive
advertising and misbranding, is not under debate.""' 14 g Such comments,
each written more than a decade after Anisman and Hogg' s paper, suggest
that the Court has moved closer to upholding, as criminal, provisions in
respect of securities that did more than simply prohibit and penalize
certain conduct. The whole apparatus of securities market regulation is
surely "preventative" and aims to maintain structures and safeguards that
prevent theft and fraud and other clearly criminal activities. The Court
probably needs to interrogate further Estey J.'s "area of legitimate
regulations": the practices "contrary to the interest of the community"
that he named are precisely some of the practices that provincial securities
commissions currently address.
Major J. presented a more conservative view. He wrote that "lesser
threats to society and its functioning do not fall within the criminal law,
but are addressed through non-criminal regulation . . . ." 9 Although
Major J. wrote in dissent, for himself and Sopinka J., such arguments
144. "Constitutional Aspects," supra note 55 at 187. As authority, they cite Smith, in respect
of a false prospectus.
145. "Constitutional Aspects," supra note 55 at 189.
146. La Forest J. has declared that "[t]he criminal law power is plenary in nature and this
Court has always defined its scope broadly": RJR, supra note 12 at 240. He cited himself when
again writing for the majority in Hydro-Quibec, supra note 13 at 289.
147. RJR, supra note 12 at 255; see also Hydro-Quebec, supra note 13 at 297-98. While this
position is now the law, it emerged only over the dissent of Major and Sopinka JJ. in RJR and,
even more narrowly, over the dissent of Lamer C.J., Iacobucci, Sopinka & Major JJ. in Hydro-
Qudbec.
148. RJR, supra note 12.
149. Supra note 12 at 359.
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might prevent subsection 91(27) from sheltering a broad statute regulat-
ing securities. Given the current composition of the Court, however, the
criminal power might be held to include a detailed regulatory scheme if,
in the words of La Forest J. with respect to environmental regulation, the
law in question underlined our society's fundamental and emerging
values.150
VII. Works and undertakings for the general advantage of Canada
Despite its inclusion among the enumerated provincial heads of power,
subsection 92(10) in fact derogates from the power in subsection 92(16)
over matters that would otherwise be of a purely local nature. This
subsection on works and undertakings might be used to support a federal
securities regulatory regime if the other enumerated and residual powers
failed. Subsection 92(10) should remain a last resort, however, because
its applications would involve at least as many implausible legal fictions
as the current recognition of provincial competence in respect of securi-
ties.
1. Connected communications or transportation works and
undertakings
Subsection 92(10)(a) empowers the federal government to legislate in
respect of transportation or communication works or undertakings that
areinterprovincial, not merely intraprovincial.I5 If so inclined, a court
could creatively characterize securities markets as interconnected net-
works that communicate offers to buy or sell, with parallel transportation
networks for choses in action. Overall, such a characterization is unattrac-
tive to courts and proponents of federal regulation of securities alike.
First, it would involve a high degree of legal fiction. Second, and more
important, the use of subsection 92(10)(a) might allow indeterminate
federal intrusion into provincial jurisdiction. If securities exchanges
could be characterized as communications and transportation systems, it
is possible that other matters might similarly fall to federal jurisdiction
under such expanded definitions. It is precisely this possibility of opening
flood-gates of intrusion that the courts have attempted to avoid. 152
150. Hydro-Quebec, supra note 13 at 297.
151. YMHA Jewish Community Centre of Winnipeg v. Brown, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1532 at 1552,
59 D.L.R. (4th) 694; Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1950] A.C.
122 at 142 (P.C.) (obiter); Re National Energy Board Act, [1988] 2 F.C. 196 at 220,48 D.L.R.
(4th) 596 (C.A.); Conklin & Garrett Ltd. v. Ontario (Director of Elevating Devices Branch of
Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations) (1989), 70 O.R. (2d) 713, 63 D.L.R. (4th)
545 (Div. Ct.), leave to appeal refused (1989), 70 O.R. (2d) 713 (note) (C.A.), leave to appeal
refused (1990), 72 D.L.R. (4th) vii (S.C.C.).
152. See Parts IH and IV above.
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2. Works declared by Parliament to be for the general advantage of
Canada
Subsection 92(10)(c) of the Constitution provides a support for federal
regulation of the securities markets by permitting Parliament to declare
a work "to be for the general advantage of Canada" and thus within its
legislative jurisdiction. The effect of the declaration is the same as if that
work were expressly enumerated in section 91.153 While this provision is
more restricted in that it applies only to works, these works are not limited
to transportation and communication.' 54 As La Forest J. has noted, "a
wide variety of works-railways, bridges, telephone facilities, grain
elevators, feed mills, atomic energy and munition factories-have been
held to have been validly declared to be for the general advantage of
Canada."' 5 5 The works apparently must be physical, although "the
legislative jurisdiction conferred over a declared work refers to the work





In 1978, it was plausible for Anisman and Hogg to argue that the
"trading floors and other physical facilities of securities markets could be
designated works under subsection 92(10)(c)." The authors felt that,
although the use of the declaratory power in this matter might be
politically difficult, the courts would not bar its use. 5 7 That argument
must be reconsidered in light of the closing of the trading floors and the
ephemeral or non-physical nature of the securities market. It is unlikely
that there is sufficient concentrated physical presence to the securities
market to allow Parliament to invoke its declaratory power in subsection
92(10)(c).
3. Conclusion
Courts should be reticent to apply subsections 92(10)(a) or 92(10)(c)
because to so find would remove a matter from provincial regulation in
a way that might set an unbalancing precedent in the distribution of
powers. Indeed, the courts are aware of this unbalancing potential. La
Forest J. has written, "There is no doubt that the declaratory power is an
unusual one that fits uncomfortably in an ideal conceptual view of
153. Ontario Hydro, supra note I 1 at 362.
154. Jorgenson v. Canada (A.G.), [1971] S.C.R. 725, 18 D.L.R. (3d) 297; R. v. Chamney,
[1975] 2 S.C.R. 151, 40 D.L.R. (3d) 146; Ontario Hydro, supra note 11.
155. Ontario Hydro, supra note 11 at 370.
156. Supra note 11 at 367.
157. "Constitutional Aspects," supra note 55 at 176.
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federalism." '158 If, however, a court held steadfastly that securities mar-
kets constituted a single industry, were local in nature, or were located
physically within provinces (contra our arguments in respect of general
trade and commerce and national concern), then proponents of a federal
securities regime might be forced to employ subsection 92(10).
Conclusion
The division of powers in section 91 and section 92 requires that the
courts referee the constant contest between Parliament and the provincial
legislatures over the limits of their legislative competence. 5 9 Whenever
a matter is not explicitly enumerated in these sections, the courts clearly
do more than mechanically apply legal categories. A court is in a
particularly difficult situation where a matter that at one time fell easily
within provincial jurisdiction has outgrown its local nature or has become
qualitatively more important to the country as a whole. In such situations,
the courts cannot avoid making assessments based on their conceptions
of the meaning and purpose of federalism. Recognizing that the under-
standing of federalism shifts over time, the courts have not articulated a
general theory as to the logic behind the division of powers. Statements
of federal principles, as in the Secession Reference, are too general to be
tests for the characterization of ambiguous or evolving matters. The result
has been that courts have engaged in case-by-case analysis. We suggest
that changing assumptions about the proper balance of powers between
the two levels of government affects where legislative competence is
recognized. Instead of direct pragmatic or theoretical discussion of the
proper distribution of powers, the Supreme Court has referred to the
delicate balance of federalism without stating the criteria by which we
could determine whether it remains balanced. The Supreme Court has
devised and applied open-ended tests that allow it room to manoeuvre
while maintaining the appearance of characterization by legal principles
other than policy alone.
We have argued that the regulation of securities markets is a matter that
has ceased to be "local" or "within the province" in any meaningful way.
Furthermore, the March 1999 Agreement confirms that the lowest level
at which markets organize themselves is national. The markets have
changed, and it is necessary for regulatory regimes to change in order to
be meaningful. We have demonstrated, further, that cooperation among
provinces to regulate securities does not yield the benefits associated with
federalism that could offset the accompanying loss of efficiency. If asked,
158. Ontario Hydro, supra note 1 at 370.
159. See generally Breton, supra note 42.
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the courts should therefore uphold a securities act passed by Parliament.
We have argued that they could do so without opening the floodgates to
indeterminate or unacceptable intrusions into other provincial powers.
The best option would be to use the federal power over general trade to
this end. This is because, while the lines of reasoning associated with both
trade and commerce and the p.o.g.g. national concern overlap, the former
power retains the basic requirement that the matter be one of general, not
particular, trade. The p.o.g.g. power has no similar limit. Federal securi-
ties regulation would easily possess the qualities required for matters of
general trade and commerce as outlined in City National Leasing and
would be the path of judicial restraint.
If, however, the federal power over general trade and commerce did
not support a national securities regime, then the national concern branch
of p.o.g.g. would likely suffice. We have argued that the provincial
inability requirement is only one indicator of distinctness that, in turn,
stands as a proxy for consideration of the federal balance of powers. Even
if the courts strictly applied the test developed in Crown Zellerbach, the
matter of securities regulation would likely satisfy the requirements for
a national concern. On the unlikely chance that neither p.o.g.g. not trade
and commerce sufficed to justify a national securities regime, its propo-
nents could attempt to support federal legislation with the banking and
criminal law heads of power. As a last resort, federal regulation of the
securities markets might be upheld by a strained use of the declaratory
power over works for the general advantage of Canada as provided for in
subsection 92(10)(c) of the Constitution.
In its reasons in such a decision, a court could take pains to emphasize
the special characteristics of securities, such as the matter's key impor-
tance in the economic structure of the nation and the high levels of
regulation that we have chosen, through our elected representatives, to
impose upon it.
We have shown that the federal regulation of securities markets would
generate benefits, respect the values of federalism, and be constitution-
ally valid. Recognition of this regulatory power by Parliament would not
precipitate unacceptable erosion of other provincial powers. On the
contrary, there is ample room in the Constitution for provinces to
cooperate in respect of inter-connected matters where such cooperation
would promote the objectives of federalism. While the politics of feder-
alism would require the federal government to negotiate its way carefully
in asserting competence over securities, we submit that the constitutional
path is now clear. We hope that our reasoning may assist in clear-headed
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